Thomas Lipscomb Shares:   "My son in law is an assistant DA in the Bronx and tells me things. If it is true that 95% of criminal trials are plea bargained and only the other 5% such slam dunks they're entrusted to green assistant DAs by prosecutors wanting to run up their conviction scores, how can I assume anything but the most likely guilt of the accused?."

 

 

TWO COINCIDENCES: I saw Judge Alvin Schlesinger died last week. And to my amazement the NYT today ran an intelligent oped on the failure of the jury system in criminal trials.

CUT: Judge Schlesinger's Courtroom 10am.... 200 jurors are about to be sworn in and we are asked "Does anyone here have any problem assuming the innocence of the accused?" I raise my hand.

I get a dour look from Schlesinger and he says "What's your problem?"

Grand Juries and Ham Sandwiches

Thomas Lipscomb:

When Alone

Does any one have a list of the evidence that the judge withheld from the jury in the Martin v. Zimm trial?

Does any one have a list of the evidence that has surfaced since the trial?

Does any one have a list of the testimony that has been recanted or added to what was given on the witness chair?

 If you have anything please send it along to HCN

Executive Branch Review Project

Obama Comes Under Review of 

The Federalist Society

The Federalist Society Practice Groups are pleased to announce the launch of the Executive Branch Review Project.  Please visit our new blog  www.ExecutiveBranchProject.com   About ExecutiveBranchProject.com An increase in Federal executive branch regulatory activity - whether through executive order, formal or informal administrative agency action - has been noted by many across the country. In launching Executive Branch Review, the Practice Groups of the Federalist Society seek to prompt a national debate about whether there has been an uptick in such regulatory activity, and, if so, with what consequence. The project will provide an objective resource that identifies major government activity, and provides a forum for debate and discussion about whether such regulation constitutes a form of legal and regulatory overreach.    Please visit www.ExecutiveBranchProject.com, bookmark the page, and plan to return often to learn more about the activities of the Executive Branch as they unfold.  Also, please do comment on the posts you will find there.  The blog, Executive Branch Review, is a forum for debate, a debate that we hope you will join.

The REAL Last Crusade: Nazi search for the Holy Grail which inspired Indiana Jones  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2298716/The-REAL-Last-Crusade-Nazi-search-Holy-Grail-inspired-Indiana-Jones.html

• Revealed in exhibition 'Dig for Germania. Archaeology under the Swastika'
• The show, in Bremen, Germany, says Himmler visited Spain to hunt for Grail
• He mistakenly thought it was hidden at Montserrat Abbey near Barcelona

A new exhibition in Germany about archaeology under the Nazis shows how the regime launched a 'Last Crusade' expedition in wartime to find the Holy Grail from the Last Supper of Christ.

In the 1989 Last Crusade movie, Indiana Jones played by Harrison Ford was on the quest for the grail - and he was in competition with the Nazis.

Now truth turns out to be stranger than fiction in the exhibition 'Dig for Germania. Archaeology under the Swastika' in Bremen. It tells how S.S. chief Heinrich Himmler allegedly visited Spain during the war because he believed the grail was at the Montserrat Abbey near Barcelona.

Real-life echo: In the Last Crusade movie, Indiana Jones played by Harrison Ford was on the quest for the grail - and he was in competition with the Nazis

The chief architect and manager of the Nazi Holocaust believed that finding the grail 'would help Germany win the war and give him supernatural powers.'

Squads of S.S. men searched in vain for the grail. The S.S. budget for such projects was vast as the Nazis intended their finds to rewrite history to prove Germans were the greatest race in all history.

 

More...

• Historians uncover First World War guns buried for 60 years on Salisbury Plain after being used as target practice for Spitfires
• Putting off the Spring cleaning until it feels like Spring? Staff at Waddesdon Manor roll up their sleeves with 45 rooms to do and the garden to tidy ready to open to the public

 

Before Hitler came to power there were just a handful of professorships in archaeology; afterwards there were 24, all tasked with promoting this claptrap theory while finding as many rare artefacts as possible from around the globe.

'If we want to again become a large, single people, we must build on the time, where the Nordic racial nucleus was still pure and unadulterated and which combined with a splendid culture which influenced all over Europe,' said Hans Reinerth, Hitler's favourite archaeologist.

Some one wrote, "I'm not defending Dorner or his violence but the police burning the cabin and killing him, they were judge and jury......We must adhere to the Constitution/rule of law. The police could have just waited him out. Our law enforcers have a duty to not use vigilante style tactics."

To be clear we are playing the role on Monday morning quarterbacks.

With this being said , the question in every case is whether the acts used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the police powers has a right to prevent.

"It is a question of proximity and degree.", Justice Holmes, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52.

Here we have a man who has killed three people, shot another two [police officers] while trying to apprehend him.

He Holes up in a cabin shooting at law enforcement officers who ask that he surrender, even after he had made it know that he would use and had used tactical skills to kill rather than surrendering.

The question that needs to be asked does the proximity and degree of his acts say that police officers need not put their lives and the lives of the community at risk?

Case law in 81 SCOTUS cases say the police acted properly.  The jury was out 81 times and returned the verdict 81 times, the police acted properly.

Is the Accomack County Attorney Screwing up and Disregarding the law?

The Answer would be yes if you follow the  Frese/UARF Exchange of emails and letters with the Accomack County's Attorney, Mark Taylor, over Taylor's Charging $.25 per page for Copies of documents. Virginia law in Va Code Section 2.2-3704.F. says the county can only charge its actual cost for producing copies:

  A public body may make reasonable charges not to exceed its actual cost incurred in accessing, duplicating, supplying, or searching for the requested records. No public body shall impose any extraneous, intermediary or surplus fees or expenses to recoup the general costs associated with creating or maintaining records or transacting the general business of the public body. Any duplicating fee charged by a public body shall not exceed the actual cost of duplication. The public body may also make a reasonable charge for the cost incurred in supplying records produced from a geographic information system at the request of anyone other than the owner of the land that is the subject of the request. However, such charges shall not exceed the actual cost to the public body in supplying such records, except that the public body may charge, on a pro rata per acre basis, for the cost of creating topographical maps developed by the public body, for such maps or portions thereof, which encompass a contiguous area greater than 50 acres. All charges for the supplying of requested records shall be estimated in advance at the request of the citizen;
Taylor told Frese in a August 31st, 2012 letter that he had the right to set the fee and part of Frese's response to Taylor's assertion was:

It Appears that you missed this in law school;

County of Alleghany v. Parrish, 93 Va. 615, 621, 25 S.E. 882, 884 (1896).

So HCN says to Mr. Taylor,  what have you got to say about that Mr. Taylor?

Frese also told HCN that Virginia is a Dillon Rule state, 

To See more on the Dillon Rule 

which is reflective in the case he cites above, which says unless Taylor has a law on which he can hang his hat on that says he can do as he alleges he has the authority to do he is just blowing smoke.

Frese/UARF

Provides a Tutorial to Accomack County Attorney Mark Taylor On The Limits of Taylor's Authority

Accomack County, Virginia: James ‘Jim’ Frese, Community Empowerment Fellow with the Unalienable Rights Foundation’s Civil Rights Division [UARF] says he provided Accomack County, Virginia’s attorney Mark Taylor with a tutorial via email on what the limits of Taylor's Powers are.

Frese says he felt he needed to do this after Frese received a letter from Taylor that addressed several of Frese’s Virginia Freedom of Information Act [VFOIA] requests. Frese noted to HCN, "Taylor says in his letter that by his contract with Accomack County that he is appointed to serve as the county’s attorney and that he is delegated with all necessary authority to preform the work of that office as Taylor’s assessment of his contract with the county is not reflective of [1] the power the Code of Virginia says he has or [2] that can be delegated to him by the county nor what the Dillon Rule sets out as the limits of the County’s and Taylor’s power/authority.

Dillon’s Rule is the cornerstone of American municipal law. Under Dillon's Rule, a municipal government has authority to act only when :

(1) the power is granted in the express words of the statute, private act, or charter creating the municipal corporation;

(2) the power is necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to the powers expressly granted; or

(3) the power is one that is neither expressly granted nor fairly implied from the express grants of power, but is otherwise implied as essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.

The Dillon rule is used in interpreting state law when there is a question of whether or not a local government has a certain power. Judge Forest Dillon, the chief justice of the Iowa Supreme Court expounded this famous rule, which was quickly adopted by state supreme courts around the nation.

A phrase derived from a nineteenth century Iowa railroad case pervades the decision-making of local governments in Virginia.

Throughout the Commonwealth, as well as many other states, "the Dillon Rule" is thought to be pivotal in framing which local government capabilities are legally permissible and which are not.

Yet the meaning of the term and its legal implications are not always well understood. Most discussions of the Dillon Rule  focus on issues of local government autonomy and growth management efforts.

Constitutional Law

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reserves to the States respectively, "all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it".

It makes no mention of local governments. Local municipal governments only exist as far as they are recognized by the respective States.

The powers delegated to localities are determined by each state respectively. This is true in all fifty states. What differs among the

fifty states is:

• how broadly state constitutions, legislatures, and courts

interpret the powers granted to local governments; and

• whether local government powers must be explicitly granted,

or explicitly denied by state legislatures.

What is the Dillon Rule?

The Dillon Rule refers to a traditional doctrine dictating that courts interpret the powers granted by a state to local governments narrowly.

Early state constitutions gave local governments a great deal of local autonomy through representation in state legislatures.

However, widespread municipal corruption during the mid-1800s led to changes in state laws that limited local autonomy in favor of

more statewide control.

Judge John Dillon of Iowa was a harsh critic of local government corruption and the nation’s premier authority on municipal law at the time. In Clark v. City of Des Moines (1865).

Dillon set forth the rule of judicial construction, which would henceforth bear his name:

The Dillon Rule:

Legal Framework for Decision-Making

It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable.

Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.

2

In 1868, Dillon’s view was upheld in an Iowa State Court decision and subsequently by the U.S. Supreme Court.

3

In 1891, the doctrine was fully adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Merrill v. Monticello. In the years that followed, the Dillon Rule became a widely accepted judicial doctrine in most federal and state courts.

A Brookings Institution study indicates that judges in 39 states employ the Dillon Rule to define the power of local governments.

4

States vary in how strictly they apply the Dillon Rule, and Virginia courts are widely considered to be among the most faithful adherents.

The Dillon Rule does not guide legislative decisions. The General Assembly is free to grant local authorities any power within the bounds of the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The Dillon Rule is applied by the courts only in situations where the grant of powers through state statutes is unclear.

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

City of Richmond v. Confrere Club, 239 Va. 77, 387 S.E.2d 471 (1990)

1. In determining the legislative powers of local governing bodies, Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction which provides that municipal corporations possess and can exercise only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential and indispensable.

2. If there is any reasonable doubt whether legislative power exists, that doubt must be resolved against the local governing body.

3. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning must be accepted without resort to extrinsic evidence or to the rules of construction. Legislative intent is determined from the plain meaning of the words used.

4. While a local official may be designated by the governing body to act where limited discretion is to be exercised, where broad discretion is involved, as in deciding to revoke a permit, the General Assembly clearly and unequivocally granted such power only to the local governing body.

5. Because the General Assembly expressly granted to the city council alone the power to suspend a permit, the council was powerless to delegate that authority to the director of finance and the director's action was invalid.

City of Richmond v. Confrere Club, 239 Va. 77, 387 S.E.2d 471 (1990) City of Richmond v. Confrere Club, 239 Va. 77, 77, 387 S.E.2d 471, ___ (1990)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 881380

Decided: January 12, 1990

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton. Stephenson, Russell, Whiting, and

Lacy, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice

The trial court improperly held that a city ordinance delegating authority to suspend bingo and raffle permits was consistent with the Commonwealth's enabling statute, and that judgment is reversed.

Cities, Counties and Towns — Dillon Rule — Rules of Construction — Delegation — Discretion — Licensing of Games of Chance — Code §§ 18.2-340.1 to -340.2 — Enabling Statutes

A city issued a bingo permit to a local club as it was authorized to do under Code § 18.2-340.8. Later the city's director of finance conducted a hearing to determine whether the club's bingo permit should be suspended or revoked as a result of the violations disclosed by an audit. After a hearing, the director of finance suspended the club's permit for a 180-day period. The club appealed the director's decision to the trial court, which ruled that suspending a previously granted permit is one of the functions bestowed by the General Assembly only upon the local governing body, and that authority to suspend the permit could not be delegated. The city appeals.

1. In determining the legislative powers of local governing bodies, Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction which provides that municipal corporations possess and can exercise only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential and indispensable.

2. If there is any reasonable doubt whether legislative power exists, that doubt must be resolved against the local governing body.

3. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning must be accepted without resort to extrinsic evidence or to the rules of construction. Legislative intent is determined from the plain meaning of the words used.

4. While a local official may be designated by the governing body to act where limited discretion is to be exercised, where broad discretion is involved, as in deciding to revoke a permit, the General Assembly clearly and unequivocally granted such power only to the local governing body.

5. Because the General Assembly expressly granted to the city council alone the power to suspend a permit, the council was powerless to delegate that authority to the director of finance and the director's action was invalid. [Page 78]

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit of the City of Richmond. Hon. Randall G. Johnson, judge presiding.

Michael K. Jackson, Assistant City Attorney, for appellant.

Joseph W. Kaestner for appellee.

JUSTICE STEPHENSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we decide whether a city ordinance delegating authority to suspend bingo and raffle permits is consistent with the Commonwealth's enabling statute.

The General Assembly has provided a comprehensive legislative scheme for licensing and regulating certain organizations that conduct bingo games and raffles. Chapter 8, Title 18.2, Article 1.1 (Code §§ 18.2-340.1 to 18.2-340.14).¹ In former Code § 18.2-340.2, the General Assembly provided that before an organization engages in any bingo game or raffle, it "shall be required to obtain an annual permit from the governing body . . . or from a local official, designated by the governing body." (Emphasis added.) Additionally, an organization's records of receipts and disbursements must be filed annually "with a local official designated by the local governing body," former Code § 18.2-340.6. Former Code § 18.2-340.10 provided that "[t]he governing body . . . may deny, suspend or revoke the permit of any organization found not to be in strict compliance with the [statute]." (Emphasis added.) Before a bingo or raffle permit may be denied, suspended, or revoked, however, the local governing body must conduct a hearing to determine whether the organization is in compliance. Former Code § 18.2-340.12.

To facilitate regulation of bingo games and raffles within the localities, Code § 18.2-340.8 authorizes local governing bodies to "adopt an ordinance, not in conflict with the provisions of [Article 1.1]." Pursuant to this enabling statute, the council of the City of Richmond (the City) adopted ordinances regulating bingo and raffles in the City. Section 4-55 of the City Code provides that "[t]he director of finance may deny, suspend or revoke the permit of any organization found not to be in strict compliance with the [Page 79] provisions of this article," and Section 4-57 empowers the City's director of finance to conduct the hearing to determine whether the permit should be denied, suspended, or revoked. Richmond, Va., City Code (1985 & Supp. 1986).

On January 13, 1986, the City issued a bingo permit to Confrere Club of Richmond, Virginia, Inc. (Confrere). Thereafter, the City auditor's staff conducted a field audit of Confrere's records for the three-month period ending September 30, 1986. The audit disclosed violations of certain accounting and recording regulations adopted by the City.

On June 16, 1987, the City's director of finance conducted a hearing to determine whether Confrere's bingo permit should be suspended or revoked as a result of the violations disclosed by the audit. After a hearing, the director of finance suspended Confrere's permit for a period of 180 days.

Confrere appealed the director's decision to the trial court, Code § 18.2-340.12, and the suspension was stayed pending the appeal. The trial court ruled that suspending a previously granted permit is one of the functions bestowed by the General Assembly only upon the "local governing body" and that the authority to suspend the permit could not be delegated. The trial court vacated the suspension and remanded the case to the City "for such further proceedings as [the City] deem[ed] advisable." The City appeals.

[1-2] In determining the legislative powers of local governing bodies, Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction. The Dillon Rule provides that municipal corporations possess and can exercise only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential and indispensable. Stallings v. Wall, 235 Va. 313, 315-16, 367 S.E.2d 496, 497 (1988); County Board v. Brown, 229 Va. 341, 344, 329 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1985); Tabler v. Fairfax County, 221 Va. 200, 202, 269 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1980); Hylton v. Prince William Co., 220 Va. 435, 440, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979); Commonwealth v. Arlington County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 573-74, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1977); Bd. of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455-56 (1975); City of Richmond v. County Board, 199 Va. 679, 684, 101 S.E.2d 641, 644-45 (1958); Donable v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533, 535, 52 S.E. 174, 175 (1905); Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711, 714, 25 S.E. 1001, 1002 (1896). If there is any reasonable doubt [Page 80] whether legislative power exists, that doubt must be resolved against the local governing body. Stallings, 235 Va. at 316, 367 S.E.2d at 497; Winchester, 93 Va. at 714, 25 S.E. at 1002.

[3] However, when a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning must be accepted without resort to extrinsic evidence or to the rules of construction. Legislative intent is determined from the plain meaning of the words used. Marsh v. City of Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987); Va. Dept. of Labor v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va. 97, 99, 353 S.E.2d 758, 760-61 (1987); Ambrogi v. Koontz, 224 Va. 381, 386, 297 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1982). When legislative intent is plain, we must respect it and give it effect. Arlington County Bd., 217 Va. at 579, 232 S.E.2d at 43,

[4] The legislative scheme makes clear that, with respect to matters in which limited discretion is exercised, a local official designated by the governing body is empowered to act. When, however, the issue is whether a permit previously granted should be suspended or revoked, broad discretion is involved. In such circumstances, the General Assembly clearly and unequivocally granted such power only to the local governing body.

[5] Because the General Assembly expressly granted to City Council alone the power to suspend a permit, Council was powerless to delegate that authority to the director of finance.² Therefore, the director's actions were invalid.

Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

Jim Frese

Community Empowerment Fellow

Civil Rights Division

The Unalienable Rights Foundation

Examines and Cross Examines

Accomack County Attorney, Mark B. Taylor's

Reply to Frese's Notice to Accomack County Supervisors

Of Their Violation of

Section 2.2-3707 of

The Virginia Freedom of Information Act

Part I

Taylor's Residency

The Taylor Estate in Fredericksburg, Virginia who's upkeep is being maintained by the $120,822+that Accomack County taxpayers are paying a year to a guy who only works 4 days a week [according to his contract]? But often you can not find him in the County, never mind his office, and no one seems to know where he is when you ask. Maybe he is here in the Mansion? Where would you be, given the choice in this Fredricksburg mansion or the sorry old offices of Accomack County?

To confirm or deny that you filed a 2011 federal income tax return, Internal Revenue Service form 1040

To confirm or deny that you filed a 2011 Virginia state income tax return, Virginia Department of Taxation Form 760

To confirm deny that on your 2011 Virginia state income tax return, Virginia department of taxation form 760 you showed your home address / residence to be 6107 Thayer Street, Fredericksburg in Spotsylvania County, Virginia [please look at Exhibit 12 below to help you refresh your memory or say this is not the home the taxpayers of Accomack County are paying you $120,000.00 a year to maintain].

To confirm or deny that section five [5] at item D, page three [3] of your April 20, 2011 employment with Accomack says that, ‘Employee shall maintain his residence within the Boundaries of Accomack County for the duration of the contract." [please look at Exhibit eight [8] below to help you refresh your memory or say this is not a provision of the aforesaid].

To confirm or deny that 6107 Thayer Street, Fredericksburg in Spotsylvania County, Virginia is not in Accomack County.

To confirm or deny that having a home 6107 Thayer Street, Fredericksburg in Spotsylvania County, Virginia and not having a home in Accomack County is a material breach of your employment agreement [section five [5] at item D, page three [3] of your April 20, 2011] with Accomack County.

Index of UARF Documents / Exhibits / Evidence

Frese's notice To Accomack Board of Supervisors Exhibit 1	Steve Minor' Reply Exhibit 2	Mark Taylor's Reply Exhibit 3
Spotsylvania County, Virginia Real Estate Bill Mark Brian Taylor or Francessa F. Taylor 6107 Thayer Street / Fox Point Lot 235 / Sec 7 Exhibit 4	Spotsylvania County, Virginia Full Real Estate Assessment Report Mark Brian Taylor or Francessa F. Taylor 6107 Thayer Street / Fox Point Lot 235 / Sec 7 Exhibit 5	Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 Exhibit 7
Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 / Sch. A Exhibit 7	Mark Brian Taylor Employment Contract With Accomack County Dated April 20, 2011 Exhibit 8	2011 Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 Instructions Cat No. 11325E Exhibit 9
White Dog Publishing v. Culpeper Bd. of Sup., 272 Va. 377, 634 S.E.2d 334 (2006) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA WHITE DOG PUBLISHING, INC., ET AL. v. CULPEPER COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Record No. 052333 Exhibit 10	Mark Brian Taylor's Lost Cause Glazebrook v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 587 S.E.2d 589 (2003) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA RAYNOLD C. GLAZEBROOK, JR., TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY Record No. 022937 Decided: October 31, 2003 Record No. 022937 Exhibit 11	The Mark Taylor Fredericksburg Mansion Exhibit 12

PART I
Billy Graham
Forensic Data Fact Checker HCN
Examines and Cross Examines

Accomack County's

Steve Miner's 

Reply 

To the April 20, 2012 Virginia Freedom of Information Request from the Civil Rights Division / Unalienable Rights Foundation's Community Empowerment Fellow ~ James Frese 

For those of you who missed it, after numerous non-responsive replies from Steve Miner, Esq. ([a member of the Virginia State Bar] Accomack County, Virginia County Administrator),  to the Unalienable Right Foundation's [UARF] Civil Rights Division's Community Empowerment Fellow,  James Frese's  Freedom of Information Act [VFOIA] request to examine public records that the Virginia Public Record Act [ACT] says the County must maintain.  Frese asked to see an index of the files, that have been classified, arranged, and indexed so that these essential public records  are made available to the public as required in Virginia Code § 42.1-86. Accomack County's Administrator finally provided  UARF with a list of files that the Administrator holds out to be what UARF asked for in its VFOIA request ; It was not and why it was not will be dealt with a bit later in this post.

To see the VFOIA Request:

After almost a month after Miner received the VFOIA that pointed out to Miner [@ ln. 50 of the VFOIA request] that the law says he shall or the county attorney, Mark Taylor, Esq. shall furnish, as the county administrator or attorney, respectively, a copy of the ACT to, "Any person elected, reelected, appointed, or reappointed to the governing body of any agency subject within two weeks following that person's  election, reelection, appointment, or reappointment" . . .  to the agency he did furnished a copy of the ACT to the Accomack County Board of Supervisors [BS] at the last BS meeting. Miner wrote and told the BS via email prior to that BS meeting and in the BS meeting that he was passing out the ACT as a refresher course. This clearly indicates to Frese and HCN that Miner was implying that the BS had previously been, in some form, provided / instructed in the ACT.

To see what was provided by the county's administrator as an index 

The index Miner provided to Frese fails to show where Miner in his eight plus years as county administrator or Taylor in his five plus years as county attorney ever provided any copies of the ACT to the BS or any other county official or employee.

This raises the question for Mr. Miner, how do you conduct a refresher course when the records and minutes of the BS meetings you maintain/created do not show where you or Taylor conducted the initial / first course nor distributed a copy of the ACT as required by the ACT in § 42.1-76.1. Notice of Chapter. — Any person elected, reelected, appointed, or reappointed to the governing body of any agency subject to this chapter shall (i) be furnished by the agency or public body's administrator or legal counsel with a copy of this chapter within two weeks following election, reelection, appointment, or reappointment and (ii) read and become familiar with the provisions of this chapter. (2006, c. 60.)

By a link of this post sent to  Mr. Miner at both 

sminer@co.accomack.va.us
and
administration@co.accomack.va.us

HCN is asking him to please confirm or deny the following: 

Mr. Miner please 

to Affirm or deny that you never complied with ACT  § 42.1-76.1. from September 15th, 2004 until April 18th, 2012. 

§ 42.1-76.1. Notice of Chapter. — Any person elected, reelected, appointed, or reappointed to the governing body of any agency subject to this chapter shall (i) be furnished by the agency or public body's administrator or legal counsel with a copy of this chapter within two weeks following election, reelection, appointment, or reappointment and (ii) read and become familiar with the provisions of this chapter. (2006, c. 60.)

Mr. Miner please 

to Affirm or deny that you were required to comply with ACT  § 42.1-76.1. from September 15th, 2004 until April 18th, 2012. 

Mr. Miner please 

to Affirm or deny that not complying with ACT  § 42.1-76.1. from September 15th, 2004 until April 18th, 2012 would be acts of omissions of acts that you were required to do [nonfeasance].. 

In early times the want of a common law remedy suited to cases of nonperformance of simple obligations caused frequent recourse to equity for relief, but in the twenty-five years of the reign of Henry VII. it was settled by the judges that an action on the case would lie as well for nonfeasance as for malfeasance, and in that way assumpsit was introduced. In theory it was an action for the nonperformance of simple contracts and the formula and proceedings were constructed and carried on accordingly. Very early, however, there were successful efforts to apply it beyond its import, and from the reign of Elizabeth this action has been extended to almost every case where an obligation arises from natural reason and the just construction of law, that is, quasi ex contractu; and is now maintained in many cases which its principles do not comprehend and where fictions and intendment are resorted to, to fit the actual cause of action to the theory of the remedy." 2 R. C. L., sec. 3. Norfolk v. Norfolk County, 120 Va. 356, 361, 91 S.E. 820, ___ (1917).

Mr. Miner please 

to Affirm or deny that Accomack County as of April 20, 2012 not in Compliance with with ACT  § 42.1-85.C. as it has not designated as records officer.  

Each . . . political subdivision of this Commonwealth shall designate as many as appropriate, but at least one, records officer to serve as a liaison to The Library of Virginia for the purposes of implementing and overseeing a records management program, and coordinating legal disposition, including destruction, of obsolete records. Virginia Code § 42.1-85.C.

. . .the lecturer, retired professor H. Douglas Brown from S.F. State, seemed perfectly willing to let the cat out of the bag about political indoctrination on college campuses

. . . exquisite and irrefutable detail the extreme liberal bias at the University of California

The Proper storage of the koran

Pakistan: Thousands of Qurans Dumped in Raw Sewage Canal

For full article