United States Supreme Court

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS
 v.
 SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1
 (Nos.  05-908 and 05-915)
  
  Argued: December 4, 2006 -- Decided: June 28, 2007
Opinion author: Roberts

===============================================================

Respondent school districts voluntarily adopted student
assignment plans that rely on race to determine which schools
certain children may attend. The Seattle district, which
has never operated legally segregated schools or been subject
to court-ordered desegregation, classified children as
white or nonwhite, and used the racial classifications
as a 'tiebreaker' to allocate slots in particular high
schools. The Jefferson County, Ky., district was subject
to a desegregation decree until 2000, when the District
Court dissolved the decree after finding that the district
had eliminated the vestiges of prior segregation to the
greatest extent practicable. In 2001, the district adopted
its plan classifying students as black or 'other' in order
to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule
on transfer requests.

Petitioners, an organization of Seattle parents (Parents
Involved) and the mother of a Jefferson County student
(Joshua), whose children were or could be assigned under
the foregoing plans, filed these suits contending, inter
alia, that allocating children to different public schools
based solely on their race violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection guarantee. In the Seattle case, the District
Court granted the school district summary judgment, finding,
inter alia, that its plan survived strict scrutiny on the
federal constitutional claim because it was narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. In the Jefferson County case, the District Court
found that the school district had asserted a compelling
interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that
its plan was, in all relevant respects, narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded.


No. 05-908, 426 F. 3d 1162; No. 05-915, 416 F. 3d 513,
reversed and remanded.



The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C, concluding:

1. The Court has jurisdiction in these cases. Seattle argues
that Parents Involved lacks standing because its current
members' claimed injuries are not imminent and are too
speculative in that, even if the district maintains its
current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, those
members will only be affected if their children seek to
enroll in a high school that is oversubscribed and integration
positive. This argument is unavailing; the group's members
have children in all levels of the district's schools,
and the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief
on behalf of members whose elementary and middle school
children may be denied admission to the high schools of
their choice in the future. The fact that those children
may not be denied such admission based on their race because
of undersubscription or oversubscription that benefits
them does not eliminate the injury claimed. The group also
asserted an interest in not being forced to compete in
a race-based system that might prejudice its members' children,
an actionable form of injury under the Equal Protection
Clause, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. P**,
515 U. S. 200 . The fact that Seattle has ceased using
the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome here is not disparities,
since the district vigorously defends its program's constitutionality,
and nowhere suggests that it will not resume using race
to assign students if it prevails. See Friends of Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528
U. S. 167 . Similarly, the fact that Joshua has been granted
a transfer does not eliminate the Court's jurisdiction;
Jefferson County's racial guidelines apply at all grade
levels and he may again be subject to race-based assignment
in middle school. Pp. 9-11.

2. The school districts have not carried their heavy burden
of showing that the interest they seek to achieve justifies
the extreme means they have chosen-discriminating among
individual students based on race by relying upon racial
classifications in making school assignments. Pp. 11-17,
25-28.

(a) Because 'racial classifications are simply too pernicious
to permit any but the most exact connection between justification
and classification,' Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S.
448 (Stevens, J., dissenting), governmental distributions
of burdens or benefits based on individual racial classifications
are reviewed under strict scrutiny, e.g., Johnson v. California,
543 U. S. 499 . Thus, the school districts must demonstrate
that their use of such classifications is 'narrowly tailored'
to achieve a 'compelling' government interest. Adarand,
supra,at 227.

Although remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination
is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test,
see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467 , that interest is
not involved here because the Seattle schools were never
segregated by law nor subject to court-ordered desegregation,
and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson County
schools were previously subject has been dissolved. Moreover,
these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U. S. 306 , in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny
purposes, a government interest in student body diversity
'in the context of higher education' is compelling. That
interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed
'all factors that may contribute to student body diversity,'
id., at 337, including, e.g., having 'overcome personal
adversity and family hardship,' id., at 338. Quoting Justice
Powell's articulation of diversity in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 , the Grutter Court
noted that ' ‘it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity,
in which a specified percentage of the student body is
in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups,'
that can justify the use of race,' 539 U. S., at 324-325,
but ' ‘a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics
of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element, ' ' id., at 325. In the present cases,
by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader
effort to achieve 'exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints,' id., at 330; race, for some students,
is determinative standing alone. The districts argue that
other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment
decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race
comes into play, it is decisive by itself. It is not simply
one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision,
as in Grutter; it is the factor. See Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U. S. 244 . Even as to race, the plans here employ
only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively
in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/'other' terms
in Jefferson County. The Grutter Court expressly limited
its holding-defining a specific type of broad-based diversity
and noting the unique context of higher education-but these
limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts
in extending Grutter to the sort of classifications at
issue here. Pp. 11-17.

(b) Despite the districts' assertion that they employed
individual racial classifications in a way necessary to
achieve their stated ends, the minimal effect these classifications
have on student assignments suggests that other means would
be effective. Seattle's racial tiebreaker results, in the
end, only in shifting a small number of students between
schools. Similarly, Jefferson County admits that its use
of racial classifications has had a minimal effect, and
claims only that its guidelines provide a firm definition
of the goal of racially integrated schools, thereby providing
administrators with authority to collaborate with principals
and staff to maintain schools within the desired range.
Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a
binary conception of race is an extreme approach in light
of this Court's precedents and the Nation's history of
using race in public schools, and requires more than such
an amorphous end to justify it. In Grutter, in contrast,
the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable in
more than tripling minority representation at the law school
there at issue. See 539 U. S., at 320. While the Court
does not suggest that greater use of race would be preferable,
the minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications
on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using
such classifications. The districts have also failed to
show they considered methods other than explicit racial
classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring
requires 'serious, good faith consideration of workable
race-neutral alternatives,' id., at 339, and yet in Seattle
several alternative assignment plans-many of which would
not have used express racial classifications-were rejected
with little or no consideration. Jefferson County has failed
to present any evidence that it considered alternatives,
even though the district already claims that its goals
are achieved primarily through means other than the racial
classifications. Pp. 25-28.

the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas,
and Justice Alito, concluded for additional reasons in
Parts III-B and IV that the plans at issue are unconstitutional
under this Court's precedents. Pp. 17-25, 28-41.

1. The Court need not resolve the parties' dispute over
whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact
on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves
intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that
the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored
to the asserted goal. In design and operation, the plans
are directed only to racial balance, an objective this
Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. They are
tied to each district's specific racial demographics, rather
than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity
needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. Whatever
those demographics happen to be drives the required 'diversity'
number in each district. The districts offer no evidence
that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve
the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with
the racial demographics of the respective districts, or
rather the districts' white/nonwhite or black/'other' balance,
since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.
In Grutter, the number of minority students the school
sought to admit was an undefined 'meaningful number' necessary
to achieve a genuinely diverse student body, 539 U. S.,
at 316, 335-336, and the Court concluded that the law school
did not count back from its applicant pool to arrive at
that number, id., at 335-336. Here, in contrast, the schools
worked backward to achieve a particular type of racial
balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration
of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits.
This is a fatal flaw under the Court's existing precedent.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra, at 494. Accepting racial balancing
as a compelling state interest would justify imposing racial
proportionality throughout American society, contrary to
the Court's repeated admonitions that this is unconstitutional.
While the school districts use various verbal formulations
to describe the interest they seek to promote-racial diversity,
avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration-they
offer no definition suggesting that their interest differs
from racial balancing. Pp. 17-25.

2. If the need for the racial classifications embraced
by the school districts is unclear, even on the districts'
own terms, the costs are undeniable. Government action
dividing people by race is inherently suspect because such
classifications promote 'notions of racial inferiority
and lead to a politics of racial hostility,' Croson, supra,
at 493, 'reinforce the belief, held by too many for too
much of our history, that individuals should be judged
by the color of their skin,' Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630
, and 'endorse race-based reasoning and the conception
of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing
to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict,' Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
When it comes to using race to assign children to schools,
history will be heard. In Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483 , the Court held that segregation deprived
black children of equal educational opportunities regardless
of whether school facilities and other tangible factors
were equal, because the classification and separation themselves
denoted inferiority. Id., at 493-494. It was not the inequality
of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children
based on race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional
violation in that case. Id., at 494. The districts here
invoke the ultimate goal of those who filed Brown and subsequent
cases to support their argument, but the argument of the
plaintiff in Brown was that the Equal Protection Clause
'prevents states from according differential treatment
to American children on the basis of their color or race,'
and that view prevailed-this Court ruled in its remedial
opinion that Brown required school districts 'to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools
on a nonracial basis.' Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U. S. 294 (emphasis added). Pp. 28-41.

Justice Kennedy agreed that the Court has jurisdiction
to decide these cases and that respondents' student assignment
plans are not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
goal of diversity properly defined, but concluded that
some parts of the plurality opinion imply an unyielding
insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when
it may be taken into account. Pp. 1-9.

(a) As part of its burden of proving that racial classifications
are narrowly tailored to further compelling interests,
the government must establish, in detail, how decisions
based on an individual student's race are made in a challenged
program. The Jefferson County Board of Education fails
to meet this threshold mandate when it concedes it denied
Joshua's requested kindergarten transfer on the basis of
his race under its guidelines, yet also maintains that
the guidelines do not apply to kindergartners. This discrepancy
is not some simple and straightforward error that touches
only upon the peripheries of the district's use of individual
racial classifications. As becomes clearer when the district's
plan is further considered, Jefferson County has explained
how and when it employs these classifications only in terms
so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict
scrutiny. In its briefing it fails to make clear-even in
the limited respects implicated by Joshua's initial assignment
and transfer denial-whether in fact it relies on racial
classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest
in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent,
and ad hoc manner that a less forgiving reading of the
record would suggest. When a court subjects governmental
action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities
in favor of the government. In the Seattle case, the school
district has gone further in describing the methods and
criteria used to determine assignment decisions based on
individual racial classifications, but it has nevertheless
failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity
of races, with only a minority of the students classified
as 'white,' it has employed the crude racial categories
of 'white' and 'non-white' as the basis for its assignment
decisions. Far from being narrowly tailored, this system
threatens to defeat its own ends, and the district has
provided no convincing explanation for its design. Pp.
2-6.

(b) The plurality opinion is too dismissive of government's
legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal
opportunity regardless of their race. In administering
public schools, it is permissible to consider the schools'
racial makeup and adopt general policies to encourage a
diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 .
School authorities concerned that their student bodies'
racial compositions interfere with offering an equal educational
opportunity to all are free to devise race-conscious measures
to address the problem in a general way and without treating
each student in different fashion based solely on a systematic,
individual typing by race. Such measures may include strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of neighborhood demographics;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments,
performance, and other statistics by race.

Each respondent has failed to provide the necessary support
for the proposition that there is no other way than individual
racial classifications to avoid racial isolation in their
school districts. Cf. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U. S. 469 . In these cases, the fact that the number of
students whose assignment depends on express racial classifications
is small suggests that the schools could have achieved
their stated ends through different means, including the
facially race-neutral means set forth above or, if necessary,
a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and
student characteristics that might include race as a component.
The latter approach would be informed by Grutter, though
the criteria relevant to student placement would differ
based on the students' age, the parents' needs, and the
schools' role. Pp. 6-9.

Roberts, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, II, III-A, and III-C, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to
Parts III-B and IV, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kennedy,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.